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RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE
ABORTION AREA
ALFRED L. SCANLAN, ESQUIRE
SHEA & GARDNER
WASHINGTON, D.C.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. It is a pleasure, up to a point, to be invited to speak to the
Diocesan Attorneys' meeting once again.
1. While this meeting is not, as Marsilius of Padua once said
of a general council of the Church, "the gathered intellig-
ence of Christiandom,' I nevertheless it is certainly the
"gathered intelligence" of Catholic lawyers throughout the
country.
B. The subject assigned to me could have been presented by men
more competent and experienced than myself.
1. Dennis Horan, Professors Noonan, Byrn, and Witherspoon,
for example.
2. My own litigation experience and my recent function as
general counsel to the National Committee for a Human
Life Amendment, Inc.
3. I have attempted to keep reasonably conversant. Perhaps,
in the words of Father John Courtney Murray to a young
Jesuit, Charles Whelan: "It isn't that I understand it, but
now I misunderstand it less."
II. GENERAL REMARKS AND OBSERVATIONS
A. The general topic assigned to me.
B. I have subdivided it into four parts.
1. The recent abortion cases following in the wake of Roe and
Doe- as far as Catholic moral principles are concerned, it
was truly a "wake."
2. The conscience clause issue, especially as it affects denomi-
national or religious-related hospitals.
3. The contraction, thank God, of the state or governmental
action theory.
W. DURANT, THE RENAISSANCE 363 (1953).
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4. Very briefly, some comments on pending proposals for a
human life amendment to the Constitution.
Im. RECENT ABORTION CASES
A. These I have divided into several categories including spousal
or parental consent, state regulation of conditions and facilities,
the viability issue, and the issue of whether the taxpayers must
pay for abortions under Medicaid-obviously not under Medi-
care.
B. Perhaps at this point it might be fruitful to summarize the
essence of the holdings of the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973) and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
1. In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court held that the fourteenth
amendment "right of personal privacy includes" a woman's
decision to abort and that the word "person" as used in the
fourteenth amendment does not include the unborn. As a
consequence, said the Court:
A state criminal abortion statute of the current Texas type,
that excepts from criminality only a life-saving procedure on
behalf of the mother, without regard to pregnancy stage and
without recognition of the other interests involved, is viola-
tive of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.
(a) For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first
trimester, the abortion decision and its effectuation
must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant
woman's attending physician.
(b) For the stage subsequent to approximately the end of
the first trimester, the State, in promoting its interest
in the health of the mother, may, if it chooses, regulate
the abortion procedure in ways that are reasonably re-
lated to maternal health.
(c) For the stage subsequent to viability, the State, in pro-
moting its interest in the potentiality of human life,
may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion
except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical
judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the
mother.2
2. Discussion of this language, including the Court's specific
reference that the considerations of health embrace physi-
cal, emotional, psychological, familial, the woman's age,
distress for life and future, the unwanted child, unwanted
1 410 U.S. at 164-65.
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motherhood, etc. In other words, the word "health" as used
by the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade, supra, means abor-
tion on demand or request.
3. The Supreme Court overturned an ALI-type of statute in
the Georgia Doe v. Bolton case.
4. In short, the Supreme Court's decisions have removed all
but the most minimal constraints or protections for the un-
born and, as Dennis Horan has pointed out, leave a consti-
tutional amendment as the only avenue through which to
correct the situation if, dear Lord, it is to be corrected.
5. A passing comment on Professor Witherspoon's thirteenth
(antislavery) amendment argument, i.e., the concept of a
"human being" embodied implicitly in the thirteenth
amendment.
a. Express my doubts as to its validity-what is constitu-
tionally guaranteed under the Supreme Court's inter-
pretation of the fourteenth amendment cannot be con-
stitutionally precluded by the thirteenth amendment.
The only hope is to revise the fourteenth amendment by
adding an amendment which repeals pro tanto the gross
gloss which the Supreme Court has put on it by its
decisions in Roe and Doe.
C. SPOUSAL CONSENT
1. In the cases decided since Roe and Doe, the courts have
consistently upheld a woman's right to abort without ob-
taining the consent of, or without the interference of, pro-
spective fathers. Doe v. Doe, 314 N.E.2d 128 (Mass. 1974);
Jones v. Smith, 278 So.2d 339 (Fla. Ct. App. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 958 (1974). The basic reason for these deci-
sions disallowing the requirement of spousal consent is that
if the state itself cannot prohibit abortion within the peri-
meters set forth in the Supreme Court decisions, supra, the
state cannot assign that power to husbands or boyfriends.
Coe v. Gerstein, 376 F. Supp. 695, 697 (S.D. Fla. 1973), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 279 (1974).
2. In a 1974 case, for example, the highest court in Massachu-
setts refused a husband's attempt to enjoin his wife from
having an abortion and declared that a husband cannot
interfere with his wife's decision to abort "at least before the
fetus is viable and in the absence of any danger to natural
life or health." Doe v. Doe, 314 N.E.2d at 132.
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D. PARENTAL CONSENT CASES
1. Here, the score is no better. Almost without exception the
courts have found parental consent requirements unconsti-
tutional even in cases of females below the legal age of ma-
jority. In this context courts have not considered abor-
tion equivalent to other surgical procedures where parental
consent may be required. Murray v. Vandevander, 522 P.2d
302 (Okla. Ct. App. 1974); In re P.J., 12 Crim. L. Rep. 2549
(D.C. Super. Ct. 1973); Doe v. Ramptan, 366 F. Supp. 189
(D. Utah), vacated on other grounds, 410 U.S. 950 (1973).
See the recent case of State v. A. Frans Koome, 84 Wash.
2d 901, 530 P.2d 260 (1975) (en banc) in which the Supreme
Court of the State of Washington, in a 5 to 4 ruling, held
that the parental consent provisions of the State's 1970
abortion law were unconstitutional. The dissenting opinion
in the Koome case concluded that the State's interest "in
the quality of the minor's abortion decision as well as in the
mental health of a pregnant minor is of a compelling nature
from the time of conception . .. ."
2. All that can be said is that perhaps the Supreme Court's
decision in Roe and Doe may leave open the possibility that
a putative father or a parent may have some interest in
approving the abortion decision of wife or daughter at or
after viability but before that time it is extremely doubtful
that any court can be induced to depart from the rather
broad reading that federal and state courts thus far have
afforded the Supreme Court's decision and rationale in the
Roe and Doe cases, supra.
E. STATE REGULATION OF CONDITIONS AND FACILITIES
1. Since Roe and Doe were decided, a number of states, includ-
ing Indiana and Illinois, have revised their abortion statutes
in an attempt to somewhat, at least, make access to abor-
tion less than free and easy.
2. Recall that the Supreme Court apparently recognized some
power on the part of states to protect viable unborn children
although, because of the Court's wide definition of health,
not much scope is afforded for the protection of such chil-
dren.
3. In Hodgson v. Anderson, 378 F. Supp. 1008 (D. Minn.),
appeal dismissed 420 U.S. 903 (1974), a three-judge federal
court invalidated the recently enacted antiabortion statute
of Minnesota which prohibited an abortion when the fetus
is potentially viable unless the attending physician certified
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in writing that in his best medical judgment abortion was
necessary to preserve the life or health of the pregnant
woman. The statute also contained a provision requiring
medical attention for a live born child which was aborted
but born in the state of potential viability. Incredibly, the
court found that a state could not constitutionally protect
the life of a live born child resulting from an abortion occur-
ring at or after 20 weeks. Insensitively, the three-judge court
said:
[Tihe statute as worded would take away from the
physician his right to determine, in the exercise of his
professional medical judgment under the technology
and medical knowledge available to the profession,
when a fetus is viable.3
4. Fortunately, the jury in the Edelin case in Massachusetts
refused to treat manslaughter as "the exercise of . . . pro-
fessional medical judgment."
5. Dennis Horan's testimony before the Senate Subcommittee
on Constitutional Amendments on April 11, 1975 refers in
Appendix B thereof to cases of live births following abortion.
One such child survived and was adopted. This situation
could become more common as the science of fetology prog-
resses.
6. The wrongful death cases which have permitted suit in be-
half of a fetus whose death was caused by the negligence of
a third party. See, e.g., Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg, 55
Ill. 2d 368, 304 N.E.2d 88 (1973). However, cases of this kind
were called to the court's attention and argued in extenso
in the amicus curiae brief which we submitted in the Roe
and Doe cases. In short, the mother is to be preferred, the
stranger isn't, even though the former is a party to an inten-
tional killing while the latter has only been negligent.
F. ABORTIONS UNDER PUBLIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS
1. In this area the cases seem to hold that when a wide range
of medical services is made available to indigent people
from public funds, abortion cannot be ruled out as one kind
of medical service. Doe v. Rose, 499 F.2d 1112 (10th Cir.
1974); Klein v. Nassau County Medical Center, 347 F.
Supp. 496 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), vacated, 412 U.S. 925 (1973)
(mem.).
2. The defeat of the Bartlett Amendment to the Department
of Health, Education, and Welfare Appropriation Bill also
378 F. Supp. at 1017.
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means that recipients of public assistance can continue to
obtain abortions under Medicaid.
3. The equal protection argument is misused in this area. Still,
the states try to do their best. Arizona, for example, has
proscribed the use of certain public property for the pay-
ment of medical assistance benefits for the performance of
abortions except to save the life of the mother. This statute
is now under challenge in Roe v. Harrison Board of Regents,
No. 149243 (Ariz. Super. Ct. 1975).
4. As Professor Witherspoon has observed, courts which strike
down these attempts to restrict the use of public money for
private abortions fail to distinguish the difference between
a regulatory statute enforced by criminal sanctions, such as
the statutes involved in the Roe and Doe cases, and rules
and regulations which deal with the use of public funds and
public property.
IV. HOSPITALS AND ABORTIONS
A. Up until now, the federal courts have held that public hospitals
may not refuse the performance of elective abortions, even when
overcrowded facilities and staff unwillingness have been as-
signed as the reasons for nonperformance. Doe v. Hale Hospital,
500 F.2d 144 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 907 (1975);
Nyberg v. City of Virginia, 495 F.2d 1342 (8th Cir. 1974);
McGarvey v. Magee-Womens Hospital, 340 F. Supp. 751 (W.D.
Pa. 1972), aff'd 474 F.2d 1339 (3d Cir. 1973).
B. Suits against private hospitals have been unsuccessful even in
the face of the so-called "state action" theory. Doe v. Bellin
Memorial Hospital, 479 F.2d 756 (7th Cir. 1973).
C. The same is true in the case of denominational hospitals.
Chrisman v. Sisters of St. Joseph of Peace, 506 F.2d 308 (10th
Cir. 1974).
1. The conscience clause aspect of the matter.
2. Justice Blackmun's dicta concerning the protections af-
forded to religious-related hospitals.
D. Our argument in the Holy Cross Hospital case.
1. The conscience clause is not necessary; we stand on the free
exercise of religion clause.
2. The conscience clause statutes illustrate the high place that
society assigns to the free exercise of religion.
3. Repudiate the tenuous argument that a religious corpora-
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tion owned and operated by its religious members cannot
have a "conscience."
E. The contraction of the "state action" attack as manifested in
recent decisions, especially the Supreme Court's decision in the
Jackson case. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345
(1974).
1. Lucas' reaction to Jackson in the Holy Cross case.
V. PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS
A. The difficulty in securing their passage.
B. The difference of opinion concerning a states' rights amend-
ment.
C. An allusion to Professor Noonan's constitutional proposal which
I think makes a great deal of sense and would have as good a
chance as any other type to get through the Congress and to the
states for ratification.
D. A caution about opposing the Equal Rights Amendment on any
theory, not justified by the legislative history of the ERA, that
its passage would somehow affect abortion laws or a subse-
quently enacted Human Life Amendment.
VI. CONCLUSION
A. The future is bleak so far as halting the flow of abortions that
is now occurring.
B. The Catholic and other religious-related hospitals seem se-
cure-conscience clause or no conscience clause.
C. The nonreligious private hospitals are less secure but if the con-
science clause holds up, they will be all right.
D. It is only, however, a constitutional amendment that could
effectively turn the tide.
1. Chance for its passage, as I have said, is not sanguine.
2. Therefore, I think a Noonan type of states' rights amend-
ment represents the best outside chance.
